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ABSTRACT
With the mounting U.S.
centered on the role of U.S.
structure as contributing factors.
This paper contends that the economic structure and
of Japan have also done much to contribute to the trade
Institutionalfeatures of Japan's macroeconomy and
structure which have promoted her large trade surplus are
and industrial policies evaluated.
Given the nature and magnitude of the role played by Japan in
causing the bilateral trade imbalance, the next question the paper
addresses is how Japan might best act to alleviate this imbalance.
This section of the paper examines fiscal, monetary and other policy
initiatives Japan might take to reduce the trade imbalance.The
evidence stresses the desirability of expanding Japan's services
industries, particularly leisure—related services.
trade deficit, much attention has
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In recent months there has been considerable debate over
how to cut the U.S. trade deficit. Perhaps because a deficit is
viewed as something "bad" and a surplus as something "good", much
attention has been focused on what the U.S. might do to improve
the situation.There is some sense to this.After all, if a
surplus really is desirable, countries like Japan which enjoy a
substantial surplus can hardly be expected to take the initiative
in altering the status quo.
Yet, it is dangerous to focus on potential U.S. actions
while relegating Japan's response to the background.The trade
imbalance is in fact a problem for Japan as well as the U.S. air
countries have grown so economically interdependent that trade
problems in the U.S. can have disastrous consequences for Japan
and vice—versa.
It is imperative to understand the Japanese perspective on
how the trade imbalance emerged, and Japan's likely role in
resolving this imbalance.These are the issues we wish to
address here. More specifically,we examine and discuss
objective features of Japan's economy and economic policies which
have contributed to the trade imbalance, and evaluate Japan's
subjective assessment of its responsibility for this problem. We
then discuss what Japan's likely response to the trade imbalance
issue will be,and the implications for Japan—U.S. trade
imbalances and trade friction.II.Japan'sRole in theTradeImbalance
Japan's role in the current trade imbalance is the result
of severaleconomic factors buttressed by an eclectic and
sometimes questionable economic philosophy.Before discussing
Japan's rationale for its role in the trade imbalance, however,
we examinethose features of Japan's economy and the economic
policies which have contributed to this problem.
Macroeconomic Structure
Japan'seconomy differs inimportant respects from that of the
U.S.Factors such as Japan's high savings rate and weak domestic
demandhave served to promote a Japanese trade surplus vis—a—vis the
U.S.The high rate of saving and weak domestic demand reflect in
part the high cost of housing and education relative to income.
To the extent that Japan's pattern of saving and domestic
demand reflect structural factors like housing and education costs,
they are likely to persist unless the Japanese government takes
active steps to induce structural change.However, to the extent
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thattheyreflect cultural factors,expansionarygovernment
initiatives may be less effective and less appreciated than they
would be in amoreconsumption—oriented society.
Onethe surface, Japan's tax structure doesnot appear to be
responsible for its sluggish personal consumption.As Table 1
indicates,taxes on individual income account for a smaller
percentageof tax receiptsin Japan (36.1%) than in the U.S.
(118.3%).This is rather surprisinginview of'thefact that the
U.S.isby far the more consumption—oriented society. However, the
damagingeffect of Japan's tax structure on personal consumption has
2come from whathasnot been taxed rather than from what has been
taxed.In particular, the tax exempt status ofprivatesavings has
raised saving relative to personal consumption.
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Otherfactors are also important.Paltry increases in real
earnings have kept consumption in check. As Table 2 indicates, real
cash earnings in Japan rarely increased by more than two percent per
annum over 1979—1985, in spite of annual productivity gains which
rarely increased by less than two percent(and which usually
increased by substantially more). Other structural features, such as
Japan's longer working hours, have also served to strengthen
savings and dampen demand.
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Nor consumptionincreases driven by economic growth a
likely outcome.Investment growth has been trending downward in
Japan for years (see Figure 1).This pattern is to be expected for
a maturing economy.The alarming fact, however, is that in recent
years, investment and saving have diverged.Figure 2 indicates
that, from about 1983 onward,savingrose sharply as a percent of
GNP,while investment leveled off.This divergence,in turn, has
induced a capital outflow, resulting in a weaker yen and a larger
trade surplus for Japan.
14Figure 1
Investment and Output Growth
percent per annum
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2*— $wSlStWlPrivate consumptionhas become an increasingly important
component of domestic demand in Japan over the past 15 years.
For instance, while buriness investment accounted for 21% of
3
dorestiedemsndin 1970, it now accounts for only 16% .While
public sectorspending increased substantially after the first
oil shock, its share of domestic demand today is roughly the same
as it was in 1970, around 17%. For this reason, sluggish private
consumption is of particular concern today.
Macroeconomic Policy
Japan's macroeconomic policies have tended to reinforce the
effects of its macroeconomic structure on the trade imbalance.
Whereexpansionary fiscal policy might havesignificantly
increased domestic demand, redressing the need to expand exports,
Japan has instead pursued a course of fiscal restraint over the
past several years.Given current Japanese sentiment, it may be
difficult to implement expansionary fiscal policy.In the
business conmiunity, fiscal expansion is viewed as an avenue of
last resort.For example, Eishiro Saito, Chairman of the Japan
Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), has emphasized
thatgovernment should explore other possibilitiesbefore
resorting to expansionary fiscal policy via a construction bond
issue:
Somepeopleargue that construction bonds to finance
social infrastructure building are different from
deficit—covering bonds, but in reality they share the
same effect of leaving debts to future generations.4
6Monetary growth har been moderate for the past decade or
so. This pattern may have come inresponse to the unprecedented
inflationJapan experienced in the early 1970s following the Bank
of Japan's failure to control the money supply during that
period.
Recently,the




Such high money supply growth is attributable to
increased corporate preference for putting idle funds
into money management instead of investment in plant.5
Given Japan's low interest rates, it is unlikely that
monetary policy could play a strong expansionary role.Larger
increases in the money supply would primarily serve to increase
inflation.
Industrial Structure
Over the past ten years, Japan has made strong efforts to
increaseproductionin itsmanufacturingsector,which
constitutes the major portion of its exports.Evidence of this
restructuring effort is striking.Table 3 indicates that total
manufacturing output has increased at an average annual rate of
5.5 percent in Japan over 19751981l, well in excess of the U.S.
(14.0percent),and much further ahead of other major industrial
countries.These manufacturing increases have been concentrated
in the more advanced industries, such as electric machinery and
processing industries, rather than in heavy industries.
7
money supply (M2 +CDs)has crept upward,
about 9 percent fromlate1985 to mid 1986.
this growthreflects,notgovernment
but weak investment. According to Bank ofJapan's industrial structure today is the outcome of a
concerted effort to become more energy—efficient in response to
the oil shocks of the 1970s.Besides increasing productive
efficiency, Japanese industries have successfully advanced into
those fields having a high income elasticity of demand.Table L
indicates that the income elasticity of Japan's exports exceeds
that of most. other major industrialized countries, particularly
ifoneincludes the 1980s.Although it is not shown, Table L
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8implies that the income elasticity of Japan's exports from the
first quarter of' 1980 to the second quarter of 1983werea
Whopping 2.31.Such a dramatic increase simply could not have
happenedwithouta strong effort by Japanese industry to change
its industrial structure.
By contrast, the income elasticity of Japan's imcorts are
far lower than in most other industrialized countries, as Table 14
also indicates. The relatively low income elasticity of' Japan's
imports can be explained in part by Japan's import structure,
which includes a high share of' raw materials and fuels.Income
elasticities are fairly low for these kinds of imports.
Industrial Policy
Just as Japan's macroeconomic policies have cocnplemented
structural features of its macroeconomy, Japan's industrial
policies have complemented its industrial structure. In response
to the havock wrought by the first oil crisis,Japanese
industrial policy sought to promote R & D investment in high
technology industries and to assist stagnant industries in
downscaling operations.
It should be noted, however, that Japanese industry, moreso
thanJapanese government,was responsible for changes in
industrial structure.To be sure, government provided guidance
and incentives, but it was industry which made the decisions
altering Japan's industrial structure.Adherence to government
directives was largely elective. Coninenting on the relationship
between government and industry during this period, Suzumura and
Okuno—Fujiwara have remarked that:
9• . .privatefirms did not have much reason to comply with
administrativeguidanceunless suchcompliance
was mandatory and/or doing so was consistent with the
firrnts private motives.Thus, the character of
industrial policy became mostly passive, indicative
and intermediary rather than active, interventionist
and regulatory.6
Trade Barriers
In terms of actual tariffs and quotas, it is difficult to
argue that Japanese protectionism has meaningfully contributed to
its trade surplus. The supporting evidence simply is not there.
Table 5 indicates, for example, that nominal tariff rates are low
in Japan relative to other major industrialized nations.
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Somecomplaints have been voiced, however, to the effect
thatunduly stringent and even discriminatorynon—tariff
barriers,suchas health and safetyrequirements,have
effectively limited exports to Japan.Given the difficulties in
obtaining reliable quantitative evidence on either side of this
argument, available evidence is anecdotal in nature. Thus, this
is likely to remain a controversial issue for some time.Since
the Japan—U.S. trade imbalance occured quite rapidly and is of
10relatively reoetvinta±, however,it is unlikely that this
pattern was strongly driven by long—standing non—tariff barriers.
Nor do there appear to have been substantial recent changes in
non—tariff barriers which might have caused a large trade
imbalance.
Capital Mobility and Japan's Capital Markets
For the past several years, the United States has been
clamoring for increased liberalization of Japan's capital markets
and increased capital mobility.This pressure culminated in the
so—called Yen/Dollar Agreement reached at the sumit meeting in
Tokyo in November, 1983.
Theintent of this agreement was to eliminateyen
depreciation allegedly caused by a combination of artificially
low interest rates in Japan and restrictions on capital flows——
restrictionswhich were particularly discouraging to capital
inflow into Japan.
The actual importance of these factors for the yen/dollar
exchange rate and, ultimately, the Japan—U.S. trade imbalance, is
a matter of considerable dispute.Some have argued that in the
past Japan has deliberately tried to depreciate the yen by
keeping domestic interest rates artificially low.At first
blush, there seems to be some evidence to support this claim. As
Table 6 indicates, interest rates tended to besubstantially
lower in Japan than in the U.S. Furthermore, while interest rates
for long—term government bonds declined in bothJapan and the
U.S. over 1982—1985, the spread actually increased.
11Tabi. 6
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Nodoes this pattern appear likely to changeany time soon.
This is particularly unfortunate since capital marketliberalization
maybethe most significant measure Japan can take, not only in
terms of appreciating the yen, but in the interest ofgreater equity
and efficiency:
.domestic liberalization (of capital markets)might be
considered the most likely (measure) to have a significant
upward effect on the yen, and to have beneficial
implications for the efficient and equitable working of
the Japanese economy.But domestic liberalization is
already taking place at a deliberate pace and is the
category of policy measures least susceptible to being
speeded up in response to U.S. pressure. 7
Interms of actual exchange rate outcomes, however, the
case against Japan is much weaker.Frankel demonstrates that,
when currency values are measured in terms ofa weighted average
amongtradingpartners, the effective exchange values of European
currencies decreased over l980_l9814, but the effectiveexchange
value of the yen actually increased. Frankel concludes from this
that:
12.the Drimary problem is with the strong appreciation of
thedollarand the roots of that appreciation within
U.S. economic policy, not with yen appreciation or Japanese
ecenonc policy.8
Fvrn ii Frankel's conclusion n true, it does not follow
that Japanese policy towards its domestic capital markets poses
no significant problems for the Japan-JJ.S. trade imbalance and
trade friction. First, the economic problem remains. While the
effective exchange value of the yen appreciated over l980_198L1,
the questions is, would this measure of the yen's value have
appreciated even more if Japan had fully liberalized domestic
capital markets?There is no quantitative answer to this
questior,but asFrankel himselfhasnoted,domestic
liberalization is perhaps the most significant capital market
action Japan can taketoappreciate the yen.
Second, the political problem remains.Regardless of the
objective effect of domestic liberalization on exchange rates,
Japan's failure to fully liberalize domestic capital markets is
perceived as a malicious effort to depreciate the yen. Hence, it
serves as a convenient scapegoat for her trading partners when
they find themselves running a trade deficit with Japan.
Furthermore, while Japan has taken greater strides in
promoting capital mobility, such measures, unaccompanied by
meaningful domestic liberalization, have served to promote a
capital outflow bias. As long as this situation persists, Japan's
capital market policy will remain a festering sore to her trading
partners.
Synthesis
While it is undoubtedly the case that the factors mentioned
13above have made the Japan—U.S.trade imbalance greater than it
otherwisewo'id have beer., it does not necessarily follow that
Japanhas been primarily responsible for thisimbalance.
The high U.S. trade deficit and interest rates, as well as brisk
consmerspending, were significant contributing factors.In
fact,the pattern of trade between Japan and her major trading
partners provides some evidence fnich suggests that the U.S.
trade deficit may be primarily a U.S. problem. Table 7 shows the
five leading countries from which Japan imports 1nile Table 8
shows the five leading countries to which Japan exports.While
the U.S. is Japan's leading source of imports by a substantial
amount, its lead in purchasing Japan's exports is truly enormous.
1
Jupin L'i.ort tr Five Major Zoro..—198q (in L1jn of o11r3: prctditrlt.u1)n by country In pr.tlw..L3).
Country iotai Mchln.ry liaw )llner1FoodQtl4r litn(ugi Kterje1. Fu1,t.Jtrs
U.s. $26.9 I0.8 $)8 32.2$5. *3.7
-




Ij,doie,Io I.ll .6 lOt .11 .11
(5) (90) (3 (3)
Au,trail. 7.2 II) (35)(i5) (6) (3)
.3 .9 2.7 .9 (20)
Note:Percent•t.rjtutjnq ol eptcj(k type. or 1.pont w-e etjsite4 rrci br ah,rt. md w, only moiflttobe Iu1tjmtrtjy, of the gu,ersl 4n1tuds Lnvolyed, s. Ic. the dollir .)ue. or •pectilo typs. .,t tmort3.
Soura.: kd.pted rr dat, in the $tettstical I1.ndbo of l985
114Tblv 8
.3lpar'aprL1 to FL4.)or SourtP_198 (l(j( U ICn orlr3per osn dLrIbut1un Lryco)fllry Ln
par
r.mtry (GUI Xhiryo$eLJ PLIlQebe
& frod.,c(. frodud.,
*59.9 *'i!.9 $.2 $L8 $6.0
(60) (2) (6) (10)
orea .2 1.2 1.1 (I(6) (65 (3) (17) (15)
Q1ri i. 3.6 28 (o (50 (i0) (i?)
Germiny
6.6 5.8 .8
6.6 .7 2.0 Xon (1QQ) (60) —
(10) (30)
NoteFercent diatrib,t
•rd Dr. 0l1yLw)t to be IllUst.rlUvfoC tb (atIri).a4xiitudeinvolved,cv ar.the dollarvelu, of apeci(kc ypei of $xpor3..
Sure.: frocdta ii t1!Uttc1 !!_ j9.
Now if Japan's industrial structure (which largely produces
machinery and equipment) were significantly responsible for the
Japan—U.S. trade imbalance, we might expect to observe a similar
pattern between Japan and other countries which import a large
share of manufactured goods from Japan. No such pattern emerges,
however.For example, although at least 50% of Japan's exports
to China, Korea and Australia are in manufactured goods, these
countries have only modest trade imbalances with Japan; indeed,
Australia enjoys a modest trade surplus vis—a—vis Japan.
III. Japan's Perceived Responsibility for the
Trade Imbalance —
Giventhe structural features arid policy measures in Japan
which have contributed to the trade imbalance, the next question
15we as< is: to what extent do the Japanese view themselves as
responsible for this imbalance?To answer such a question
requires an understanding of both traditional Japanese values and
morerecent adaptations in response to changingeconomic
realities.
Why Japan Does Not Feel Culpable
Traditionally, Japan has been a hardworking, team—oriented
society. The Japanese work longer hours than doworkers in
other major industrialized countries.Table 9 indicates that
Japaneselabor works substantially more hours thantheir
counterparts in the U.S., the U.K., France and West Germany. If
anything, this gap appears to be increasing over time.
Table 9
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16Japan'scommitmer to achievement through individual.
sacrifc ai collective cooperation makes itanation
rrti2ul2rly reluctant t:'acceptthe blame when trade imbalances
arise.This reluctance is exacerbated when the cplaining
trading partn'viz., t'n U.S.)enjoysa higher standard of
living (especially if leisure and housing are included) with
apparently less sacrifice.
A predilection for cooperation and individual sacrifice
makes Japan less likely to feel responsible for the trade
imbalance for two reasons. First and more obviously, Japan tends
to view its economic achievements as a direct result of sweat and
sacrifice. As such, Japan takes a dim view of' pressure by other
nations to relinquish what it regards as its "just desserts."
Second, the team—oriented nature of Japanese society makes
it difficult to point an accusing finger at any one segment of
the society.In the U.S., perhaps the antithesis of a team—
oriented society, there is no shortage of accusing fingers.
Consumers point to ill—advised U.S. macroeconomic policy as
contributing to the trade imbalance while government is quick to
cite spendthrift consumers as the main culprits. In a team—
oriented society, however, it is more difficult to point an
accusing finger at the poor performance of one or two members of
that team. To function smoothly, a team must collectively accept
blame or collectively reject blame. While Japanmay privately
acknowledge that some of its sectors have contributedto
increasing the trade imbalance, collectively, Japan does not feel
significantly responsible for it. "Team Japan" does not feel that
it has commited any foul play.
17In addition to traditional and cultural factors, adaptations
in Japan's attitudes and philosophies have helped promote its
industrial restructuring following the first and second oil
crises.The most important adaptation was inspired by Professor
9
Thurow's"Zero—Sum Society" doctrine .Accordingto this
doctrine, if one economic entity gains, the other must inevitably
lose.
Published in 1980, Professor Thurow's ideas were enormously
popularin Japan,especially among the Japanese business
community. The appeal that such a doctrine held for the Japanese
during this time is not surprising.In response to the oil
crises of the 1970s, greater energy efficiency in production and
increased exports to pay for the high cost of oil imports were
objectives of top priority in Japan.While these goals held
great promise for Japan, it was apparent that they could lead to
trade deficits and/or loss of international competitiveness for
Japan's trading partners, most notably the U.S.The Zero—Sum
philosophy argued that such outcomes, while perhaps unfortunate,
were inevitable.Now if a Zero—Sum world were as inevitable as
'I
the most hard—boiled laws in economics, then such a rationale for
Japan's industrial restructuring efforts would seem even better
than appealing to cultural and traditional factors unique to
Japan. Cultural and traditional explanations for Japanese
industrialretrenchment could always be attacked as being
outdated and inappropriate for a major economic power like Japan.
But .fno could dispute the "inevitable"?
18F -&
StButhe Zero—Surr philosophy is certainly not the most
L)1:L.jouL UL Liuduoutccrie between
Japan and thn U.S., andi prnhihly not. the most accurateway.
There is, in fact, a much older (and perhaps more enduring)
doctrjncthanthe Zero—Sum doctrine to characterize possible
tradeoutcomes between Japan and the U.S.This is the classic
Prisoner's Dilema.According to the Prisoner's Dilemma, either
both parties can cooperate, and each become betteroff, or each
can try to deceive the other, in which case both becomeworse
off.
Given thc large and growing economicinterdependencebetween
Japan and the U.S., the potential harm that either country can
inflict upon the other and the potential benefitthat either
country can bestow on the other are considerable.These are
precisely the conditions under whichthePrisoner's Dilemma
arises.
AsidefromJapan'scultural factorsandpolitical
philosophies which mitigate feelings of responsibility for the
current trade imbalance, there is genuine sentiment inJapan that
the U.S. is largely responsible for the current trade deficit and
is trying to "slough off"responsibility for it ontoJapan.
Expressing the Japanese view on this issue, Komiyastates:
Thatthefundamental sources of the Pxnerican current
account deficit lie principally in the Americaneconomy
and a correction of the (trade) deficitdepends on
improvement in macroeconomic policies of the United States
itself, must be very clear topeoplewhounderstandjust a little economics.1O
To many Japanese, U.S. accusations ofJapan's responsibility
19in the trade imbalance is little more than the irrational ravings
of a bested competitor:
When a country falls into a difficulty, the domestic
reaction is often to emphasize that it is caused by
unreasonable and unfair actions of foreign countries.
Criticism of Japan is partly to be understood in this
context, and is thus not something which will drift away
of its ownaccord.11
To be sure, the official stance of the Japanese government
on Japan's role in the trade imbalance is considerably more
diplomatic.On numerous occasions, Prime Minister Nakasone has
declared that Japan should promote international harmony by
cooperating to reduce the trade imbalance.
The official government position almost certainly results
from Japan's concern over potential U.S. protectionism, not
because Japan feels responsible for the trade imbalance.One
need not look too far beneath the surface before evidence of'
Japan's resentment and concern over U.S. protectionist measures
to redress the trade imbalance clearly emerges.For example,
12
MITI Chief Michio Watanabe labelled as "outrageous" a bill
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives designed to
toughen laws against unfair trade practices and
forceother nations to reduce "excessive"trade
surpluses with United States.13
ForeignMinister Shintaro Abe also voiced strong disapproval of
11
thisbill.Behind a veil of soothingdiplomatic oaths, Japan's
governmentseems no happier about U.S. pressure to reduce the
trade imbalance than do her constituents.The difference is the
government has a better appreciation of the political realities.
20Thus far, we have discussed objective features of the
Japareeeconcey which have contributed to the trade imbalance
and Japan's perception of its responsiblity for that imbalance.
While we have isolated a number of features of Japan's economy
which have contributed to the trade imbalance, there is scant
evidencethat Japan feels at fault for this pattern.In fact,
quitethe opposite seems to be the case.
IV. What Will Japan Do?
ThatJapan does not feel responsible for the trade
imbalance andresentsU.S. pressure to help alleviate it seems to
suggestit will dolittle more than pay lip service to U.S.
demands for active involvement in reducing the trade imbalance.
Such a conclusion, however, is inaccurate. It is inaccurate for
the simple reason that Japan has too much to lose by failing to
cooperate with the U.S.Strong protectionist measures by the
U.S. would be disastrous for the Japanese economy, and Japan
would much sooner cooperate, albeit grudgingly, than deal with
U.S. protectionism. There are a variety of measures Japan might
take to alleviate the trade imbalance, and we turn nowto an
examination of these possibilities.
Exchange Rate Realignment
Exchangerate realignment has already taken place on a
grand scale, with the yen appreciating from a low of
2140 U$ in September, 1985toabout 160L'$ byJuly, 1986.
21Altriouh the conventional wisdom holds that yen appreciation
alone will not resolve the U.S.—Japan trade imbalance, the U.S.
must recognize that the yen appreciation which has already
occurred has had a substantial and negative impact on the
Japanese economy. Estimates indicate that Japan's export—
oriented industries will sustain a 30% drop in profits in fiscal
15
year 1986.
Indeed, yen appreciation has already made itself felt at the
macroeconomic level.Japan's seasonally—adjusted GNP dropped by
0.5 percent in real terms in the first quarter of 1986. This was
the first such drop in Japan's GNP since 1975.In light of the
adverse effects of yen appreciation, Japan is most reluctant to
allow the yen to appreciate further, and in fact has taken active
16
steps to prevent a further rise in the yen. That yen
appreciation appears to have had little effect over the short run
17
in reducing the trade imbalancewill probably not induce Japan
to embark on further efforts to strengthen the yen.Exchange
rates are about as realigned as they are going to get.
Domestic Demand Expansion
This is the most potent and controversial measure Japan can
take to alleviate the trade imbalance.In spite of its great
promise, domestic demand expansion will proceed more slowly than
did exchange rate realignment. Japan is concerned about possible
adverse effects of' fiscal stimulus, and is likely to implement
substantialfiscal stimulus only if U.S. pressure to do so
increases.
Japan's reluctance toimplementdomestic demand expansion
22results fro: several factors. First, there is the problem of the
"greying'c Japa —theever—increasing number of Japanese who
must be supported by social security.To support their retirees
.manyin Japan deem vital the present buildup of
foreign assets through the current account surplus.18
Second,thereis concern that fiscal stimuluswill
substantially increase government deficits.It is also feared
thatsuch deficits will limit policymakers' ability to set
interest rates and will ultimately be inflationary.Another
concern is that, given Japan's low propensity to import, fiscal
stimuluswill have little effect on imports and will not
substantially improve the trade imbalance.
Upon closer inspection, however,these arguments are not
compelling.Relying on a current account surplus to support
retirees amounts to Japan's supporting its retirees at the
expense of other nations. To the international trading community
this is hardly a good reason for Japan to continuerunning a
current account surplus.
Inflationary fears in the wake of a moderate government
deficit in Japan seem groundless, precisely because domestic
demand is relatively low while saving is relatively high.The
argumentthat government deficits may decrease policymakers'
abilitytosetinterest rateswillnot bereceived
sympatheticallybyJapan'stradingpartners.Thisis
particularlytrue of the U.S., which has been pressuring Japan to
liberalize its capital markets for years.Finally, concern that
23fiscal stimulus will be ineffective in reducing the trade
imbalance simply because it mayfail to increase imports
conveniently ignores other potentially beneficial effects of
fiscal stimulus,such as increasing domestic demandfor
manufactured goods which are typically exported, or increasing
the demand for services.
Generally speaking, there is some agreement as to the value
of domestic demand expansion in a broad, abstract sense.There
are considerable differences, however, as to how such stimulus
might best be implemented. Given Japan's high saving rate (which
is largely due to high personal saving) and low personal
consumption, an ideal policy would be one directly aimed at
reducing saving and increasing personal consumption.Government
could help achieve this goal by removing the tax exempt status of'
personal saving and by reforming tax and finance policies to
promote housing investment and demand.
Furthermore, there can be little doubt that shorter working
hourswould significantly expand demand intheservices
industries.This is so because (1) Japanese work much longer
hours than do their counterparts in other industrialized nations
(see Table 9)and(2) while many Japanese have already acquired
manufactured goods, there seems to be strong pent—up demand for
servies.
Figure 3showsthe dramatic rise in Japan's consumption of'
durable goods in the past fifteen to tenty years.Today, nearly
all households in Japan own washing machines, vacuum cleaners and
color TV sets. Sizable proportions own stereos and automobiles as
well.
243y contrast,consumption of services seems to have lagged
behind.Thispatterndoes not, however, reflect consumer apathy
19
towardservices.Indecd, 198t public opinion survey data
indicates thatJapanesegave top priority to enjoying their
leisure activities.This rated ahead of'housing,which had
received toppriorityeach time the public opinion survey had been
conducted prior to 198i. By contrast:
...'durable goods' and 'clothing', for which most
familieshave already attained satisfaction to a
level,(did) not play important roles in planning or
wishesconcerningfuture living.20
Itis also interesting tonote that, from 1970 to 198'4, the share
ofconsumption expenditures devoted to reading and recreation
21
activities actually decreased from 9.2% to 8.7%.The overall
impressionis that potentialdemand intheservices industry —
particularlyrecreation—related servies —isa major untapped
sourceof economic growth.
.F:ip343




Source: SlatisticalHandbook of 1985.It will not be easy to translate potentialdemand for
services into actual demand, however. 1ajor Japanese firms and
their subcontractors have already suffered from yen appreciation,
and they are hardly likely to respond to this setback by asking
their employees to work shorter hours. Another unhappy result of
Japan's sluggish industrial sector is that wage hikes will
22
continue to be low,which will also adversely effectdemand
for services.Additionally, substantial increases in the demand
for services will require a shift in industrial structure from
manufacturing industries to service industries.Some industries
will surely suffer from such restructuring, and they will
naturally resist.
From a society—wide perspective,increased demand for
services and a corresponding industrial restructuring would be
desirable, for it would improve the quality of life and induce
structural changes which would make Japan less dependent on
exportsforeconomic growth. Furthermore, since services tend to
beconsumed frequently relative to manufactured goods, once
domestic demand for services has been firmly entrenched and
industry restructured to accomodate it, domestic demand for
services could provide a boost to the Japanese economy for a long
period of time.In the absence of strong governmental actions,
such as regulations on length of the week and incentives for
expansion in the services industries, however, this type of
domestic demand expansion will probably not occur.Sc far,
26policmkers have shown little inclination to provide a strong
stiv1s to domestic demand for services.
Domestic demand stimulants, such as a shorter work week and
elimjnatjon of tax exempt status from personal savings, could
also increase the demand for manufactured goods. This wouldhelp
divert some Japanese exports to domestic markets.Furthermore,
those government initiatives specifically aimed atincreasing
domestic demand for manufactured goods (as opposed to services)
may be more politically feasible to implement, since industrial
restructuring requirements to meet higher domestic demand for
manufactured goodswouldprobably be lower. Unfortunately, Japan
does not appear inclined to take the initiative in expanding
demand by these means, either.
Another way to expand domestic demand is by increasing
public expenditures.Here Japan has shown some progress.For
example, the government is committed to implementing increases in
constructionbonds tofinanceimprovements inJapan's
infrastructure, though Prime Minister Nakasone has stressed that
23
such increasesshould be kept to a minimum. As Table 10
indicates,both governmentdeficits and bond issues have been
trending steadily downward relative to GNP since 1979. Thus,
thereappears to be a good deal ofroom for this type of dc*nestic
demandstimuluswithout inviting adverse consequences. Such
expansionwill indirectlyreducethe trade surplus by reducing
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The directeffects of this type of expansion on Japan's
trade surplus are less clear.Will an increase in public
spending to improve Japan's infrastructure increase Japan's
imports? Possibly, but probably not enough to significantly
affect the Japan—U.S. trade imbalance.While Japan imports a
substantial amount of the raw materials needed for construction
from the U.S. (see Table 7), this figure pales in comparison to
Japan's exports to the U.S. (see Table 8). It is equally unclear
thatincreasedexpenditures on publicconstructionwill
appreciably divert Japanese exports to the U.S.—Japan exports
manufactured goods to the U.S., not lumber and cement.
friother drawback to this type of demand stimulus is that it
can only last over a short to midterm horizon.Government can
only incur so much debt before the public will call for
austerity.Precisely because the effects of this type of
domestic demand stimulus are only temporary, it is not likely to
induce an appreciable change in Japan's industrial structureaway
28from expertor-atioi.
ALt.t.best. thcan besaid for this type of domestic
deiexpansion is that it may help Japan toweather the
damaingeffects of yen e;preciation on her export sector without
sliding into arecession.
Alternative Possibilities
Aside from exchange rate realignment and domestic demand
stimulus,there isthe possibility of improving the bilateral
tadedeficit between Japan and the U.S. by diverting some
Japareseexports to developing countriesratherthan to the U.S.
market. The import capa :ity of thesedeveloping countries would
beenhanced by directing the Japanese saving surplus to finance
the deficits of developing countries.Such a proposal was made
in a report by a study group of the World Institute for
214
DevelopmentEconomics Research (WIDER), in April, 1986.
While creative andnovel, this appears nonetheless to be a
planwhose time has not yet come.When the economies of
developingnations are sufficiently mature toprovide markets and
investment opportunities that are reasonable substitutes for
those available in the U.S., then one can meaningfully speak of
resolving U.S.—Japan trade imbalances by divertingJapan's
exports and capital outflow to places other than the U.S.
For the next several years at least, it is most unlikely
that developing countries will be able to absorb Japanese exports
on a scale large enough to significantly reduce the Japan—U.S.
tradeimbalance. Looking back at Table 8,we see that the value
29oi Japan's cxporL to th U.S. are more than twicethevalue of
Japan'sexports to its next four largest markets combined. It is
also unclear whycapitalshould suddenly flow from Japan to
developing countries when the current flow from Japan to the U.S.
indicates that better investment opportunities exist inthe U.S.
Speaking of capital outflows,another alternative for
reducing the U.S.—Japan trade imbalance is simply to restrict
capital outflows from Japan. To the extent that such outflows
tend to depreciate the yen, their elimination shoulddecrease the
U.S. trade deficit.This solution, however, is at odds with
long—standing U.S. efforts to deregulate and liberalizeJapan's
capital markets.It could also lead to substantially higher
interest rates in the U.S., and even a recession.This policy
would be so negatively received in the U.S. that it ismost
unlikely to be implemented. Even if this were not thecase, Japan
appears unwilling to undertake actions which might further
appreciate the yen, as noted above.
Exchange rate real igninent and domestic demand stimulus
emerge as the two options Japan may resort to in redressing the
trade imbalance. Since exchange raterealignment has apparently
been implemented to the extent feasible,however, fiscal stimulus
to expand Japan's domestic demand loomsas the lone viable option
for Japan to help further reduce the trade imbalance.
There is every reason to believe that sucha policy can
succeed. That Japan must depend on exports forgrowth is a myth.
As Table ii indicates, only over 1980—19814did exports account
for a substantial proportion of Japan's overallgrowth in real
GNP.There is no reason whythepattern in earlier years, when
30real CThJP growth was driven domestically, cannot be repeated in
the future.
Despite its seeming promise, strong fiscal stimulus remains
an optionthatJapan will resort to only if sufficiently
pressured by the US. Whether such U.S. pressure arises depends,
in turn, on the success of U.S. policy initiatives like Gramm—
Rudman in reducing government spending and, ultimately, the trade
imbalance.
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V.Conclusion: Implications for the Trade Imbalance and
Trade Friction
The U.S.is hell—bent on reducing its trade deficit with
Japan. This will be accomplished, one way or another.The most
benign scenario would be that the policy initiatives of Gramm—Rudman
are spectacularly successful in reducing the U.S. tradedeficit, so
that the trade imbalance is resolved without furtherU.S. pressure
on Japan.
On the other hand,if' Gramm—Rudman fails to significantly
reduce the trade imbalance, protectionist sentiment will flareup
in the U.S.Even when Gramm—Rudman was in its early stages of
promise, Congress demonstrated its willingness to consider strong
protectionist legislature when the House of Representatives
passed a bill calling for a variety of protectionistmeasures
including some new definitions of unfair trade practices.One
can only conclude that protectionist sentiments will be much
32stronger should Granrn—Rudman fail.
If'Graum—Rudmanfails, Japan willrespond to mounting U.S.
pressureby playing its last card—substantial fiscal stimulus.
Most likely, this stimulus will first come in the form of greater
efforts to expand public works.
Tax cuts, removal of the tax exempt status of personal
saving and the like may follow if' the public works expansion
fails to abate mounting U.S. protectionist sentiment.Under
either scenario, the trade imbalance will be substantially
reduced.
More ominous, however, are the implications for trade
friction.It is probably true that, other things remaining the
same, a decline in a trade imbalance results in a decline in
trade friction.But, in reducing the large trade imbalance
between Japanandthe U.S., "other things", such as mutual trust
and respect and a sense of international economic cooperation,
may fall by the wayside. It is even conceivable that, in reducing
the trade imbalance, Japan and the U.S. will intensify their
trade friction.
Many of the factors which could induce this unhappy result
are already present. On the one hand, we see the U.S. pressuring
Japan to open its goods and capital markets while at the same
time threatening Japan with increased protectionist measures.
Whilethis may be an expedient way to reduce the trade imbalance,
it is glaringly hyprocritical and hardly conducive to mutual
trust and respect.
For its part, Japan seems too slow to realize that:
33If one country's economic performance moves against
the interest of the world economy, that country will
beasked tochange course.25
Ratherthan aocepting small trade surpluses as an exogenous
political constraint in formulatingdomestic policy,Japan
decidesdomestic policy as itseesfit,makingsignificant
changesonly -ien countervailing actions by its trading partners
seem imminent.
Exacerbating these basic problems is the fact thatyen
appreciation has apparently not been a strong force in reducing the
trade imbalance. Masaya Miyoshi of the Keidanren (Japan's Federation
ofEconomic Organizations) has remarked that
theUnited States attaches importance to the
results (while) Japan ...placesimportance on
good intentionmore that anything else.26
If there is some truth to Miyoshi's observation, the salient
effectof exchange rate realignment might lie, not in decreasing
the trade imbalance, but in increasing trade friction.
In fact, aside from harming Japan's export sector directly, it
is becoming increasingly clear that the strongyenis prompting many
3apanese comPanies)Particularly those in the critical automotive and
electronics industries) to establish plants at locationS abroad,
including the U.S.From the standpoint of economic theory, these
responses result from firms' desire to maintain international
competitiveness.From the perspective oftheaverage rker,
however, this means fewer jobs.Hence, the popular terms for
relocation of'Japaneseplants abroad are "deindustrialization" and
the"hollowing out"of Japanese industry.Totheextent that
314relocation isviewedas "hollowing out," it is likely to increase
28
frictionbetweenJapanandtheU.S.
Likemany trading partners,however, Japan and the U.S. have
beenconducting business under less than ideal circumstances for
anumberof years,and will likely continue to do so.
Interestingly, the very fact that there remains much roan for
improvementin cooperativeefforts andfreeing of markets between
the two nations helps prevent trade friction fran really getting
out of hand.As long as trade imbalances and trade friction can
be blamed on relatively benign factors like policy coordination
failure,closed markets and the like, the possibility of mutually
beneficial trade remains.But imagine what might happen if the
U.S.,for example, incurred substantial trade deficits with Japan
in a world where both countries behaved cooperatively, policies
were prefectly coordinated and all markets were open.In such a
world, U.S. deficits would be seen as due to a pervasive lack of
competitiveness.Trade friction on a scale we have not yet
observedwould ensue.
Thisdoes not imply that we should not seek to reduce the
tradefrictionwhichispresenttodaythroughpolicy
coordination,open markets and the like. Nor does it imply that
substantial trade friction is inevitable.We merely wish to
pointout that, while Japan and the U.S. should work together to
achieve better coordinated macroeconomic policies and more open
markets, each country must remain acutely aware that maintaining
theinternational competitiveness of its industries isa
fundamentalingredientin healthytraderelations. If
35international competitiveness is not maintained,very serious
trade friction will emerge.
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